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AUSTRALIA and Brian Vuong JOHNSON WINTER & SLATTERY
The recent decision of the full bench of the Federal
Court in Leveraged Equities Ltd v Goodridge1 has
unanimously overturned the contentious first instance
decision of Rares J2 and, in doing so, has restored clarity
to the legal principles governing assignment and nova-
tion of contracts. Although the decision centred on the
enforcement of margin lending arrangements and the
proper construction of an ambiguously drafted contract,
the case has wider implications for syndicated loans,
securitisations and commercial transactions generally.
The first instance decision caused much consternation
in financial and legal circles, as it appeared to challenge
existing legal principles and practice regarding the
novation and assignment of contracts. Although several
commentators suggested that the statements from the
Goodridge decision should be confined to the specific
facts, there was concern that if applied more broadly, the
Goodridge decision undermined the validity of existing
loan transfers, securitisations and other commercial
transactions.
The appeal decision has put such fears to rest, while
providing a cogent and authoritative summation of the
Australian law on novation and assignments, in line with
both English and US authorities. Nevertheless, there are
some aspects of the decision which may require further
clarification.
Background
The litigation arose in the wake of the global financial
crisis and the stock market crash of February 2009.
Plunging stock prices saw Mr Goodridge receive a series
of margin calls under his margin loan with Leveraged
Equities Ltd (Leveraged Equities). After Mr Goodrige
failed to meet these margin calls, Leveraged Equities
exercised its right to sell Mr Goodridge’s portfolio at
what, in hindsight, was the bottom of the market.
The case was further complicated by Macquarie Bank
Ltd’s (Macquarie’s) sale of its $1.5 billion margin loan
book to Leveraged Equities in January 2009 — only one
month before the margin calls were made. Mr Goodridge’s
margin loan, which had originally been entered into with
Macquarie in 2003, was sold and purportedly transferred
to Leveraged Equities (via an intermediate securitisation
entity) as part of that sale.
Mr Goodridge challenged the validity of the margin
calls and Leveraged Equities’ right to exercise its power
of sale. The arguments on these points were primarily
concerned with the proper construction of the margin
call and the default clause of an ambiguously drafted
loan and security agreement (LSA). More importantly,
Mr Goodridge also challenged the validity of Macquarie’s
transfer of his margin loan to Leveraged Equities in
2009 and whether Macquarie’s rights under that contract
were legally capable of assignment.
First instance decision
The trial judge, Rares J, decided all issues of con-
struction in favour of Mr Goodridge, finding that under
the terms of the LSA the margin calls were invalid and
thatLeveragedEquitieshadnoauthority to sellMrGoodridge’s
portfolio.
However, the more controversial aspects of the deci-
sion related to the finding that the transfer ofMrGoodridge’s
loan book from Macquarie to Leveraged Equities was
ineffective, and on that basis Leveraged Equities was not
entitled to exercise any rights under the LSA.
Among other things, Rares J held as follows.
• The novation was not effective, as it was impos-
sible for Macquarie to novate the LSA to a third
party without the participation and knowledge of
Mr Goodridge. Moreover, the prospective consent
to novation provided by Mr Goodridge under
cl 21.2 of the LSA was described as “nebulous”
and characterised as no more than an “agreement
to agree”.3
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• The purported assignment of Macquarie’s rights to
Leveraged Equities was not effective because:
— Macquarie’s rights (such as the right to require
repayment) were so interconnected with its
obligations (such as the obligation to make
further advances under the LSA) that the rights
were incapable of assignment;
— the tripartite arrangements under which Lever-
aged Equities assumed the rights of the lender
while Macquarie retained further funding obli-
gations were “unworkable”;
— the wide discretions given to the lender sug-
gested that the identity of the lender was
important to Mr Goodridge, and therefore the
lender’s rights were personal and not capable of
assignment; and
— under s 12 of the Conveyancing Act 1919
(NSW), to perfect an assignment Mr Goodridge
needed to receive actual notice of the assign-
ment (which Rares J considered had not been
demonstrated on the facts).
Appeal decision
On appeal, the Full Court of the Federal Court (in a
leading decision by Jacobson J, with whom Finkelstein
and Stone JJ agreed) decisively rejected each of these
findings. In doing so, the court has provided clear
guidance regarding the legal principles applicable to the
novation and assignment of receivables, and to contracts
generally. Nevertheless, there are some aspects of the
decision which may require further clarification.
Novation
The court held that the novation from Macquarie to
Leveraged Equities was effective. Contrary to Rares J’s
findings, it was not impossible for a contracting party to
prospectively authorise a novation to be made by another
party unilaterally.
The court citedAustralian,4 English5 and US6 authori-
ties before unreservedly concluding that Rares J’s find-
ings did not represent Australian law.7 In doing so,
Jacobson J flagged and tacitly concurred with stinging
criticism of the first instance decision levelled by Cook J
in Habibsons Bank Ltd v Standard Chartered Bank
(Hong Kong),8 which described Rares J’s conclusion as
“wholly uncommercial” and a “purist point” which is
contrary to the development of the law of contract.9
The court considered that cl 21 of the LSA made it
sufficiently clear that Mr Goodridge (as borrower) had
given prospective consent to all the elements needed to
give effect to a novation.10 Clause 21 permitted the
substitution of a new lender on the same terms and
conditions as the LSA. Accordingly, there was “no
uncertainty about the terms and conditions of the new
contract to which Mr Goodridge consented to be a
party”11 and the consent was not, as Rares J had found,
simply a “nebulous” agreement to agree.
Although the court ultimately decided that a proper
construction of cl 21 permitted the novation byMacquarie,
it closely analysed the drafting of the novation clause
and noted that the language used was crucial. Jacobson J
commented that the drafting clearly fell short of the
clear terms of the syndicated loan novation clause which
was discussed and approved in the English case of Argo
Fund Ltd v Essar Steel Ltd.12
In practice, assignment and novation clauses in com-
mercial documents rarely contain the detailed transfer or
substitution mechanics commonly included in syndi-
cated loan agreements, and the Goodridge assignment
and novation clauses were by no means atypical. Nev-
ertheless, the Goodridge decision suggests that a nova-
tion clause should, at a minimum, address each element
required to give effect to a novation, namely that:
• the new party will assume the rights and obliga-
tions of the outgoing party;
• the outgoing party will be released from those
rights and obligations; and
• the new contract will be novated on the same
terms and conditions as the existing agreement.
While the drafting in cl 21 was ultimately held to be
sufficient to authorise a novation, Jacobson J neverthe-
less commented that the draftsperson may have failed to
give sufficient attention to the distinction between assign-
ment and novation.13 In light of this comment, lawyers
would be wise to revisit the drafting of precedent
novation clauses to ensure that they adequately and
unambiguously address each of the key elements referred
to above.
Trustee limitation of liability
Another reason why the trial judge held the novation
to be ineffective was the “substantive difference” between
the obligations of Macquarie and those assumed by
Leveraged Equities.14 As part of the novation, Lever-
aged Equities entered into the documents solely in its
capacity as trustee and limited its liability to the extent
of its actual indemnity from trust assets. Rares J consid-
ered that this limitation of liability was a substantive
change that Mr Goodridge had never consented to in
advance.15
On appeal, Jacobson J disagreed and held that the
limitation of liability clause did not alter the obligations
owed by Leveraged Equities to Mr Goodridge. In his
view, the clause was only related to the capacity in
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which Leveraged Equities had entered into the docu-
ments. As Leveraged Equities entered into the docu-
ments solely as trustee, it was consistent that any
recourse be limited to the assets of the trust.16 He
considered that this view was further supported by a
clause of the LSA which specifically provided for
“novation to any trustee or manager or any securitisation
programme”.17 Jacobson J held that Rares J’s approach
precluded any such novation to a trustee.18
With respect, although limitation of liability clauses
are industry standard for trustees (including in securitisa-
tions or syndicated lending arrangements), a trustee need
not include such a limitation in its contracts and a failure
to include such a clause does not preclude the novation.
Unlike a company or natural person, a trust is not a
separate legal entity. As a consequence, the trustee (not
the trust itself) is personally liable for all liabilities
incurred in its capacity as trustee and must rely on its
right to be indemnified from the assets of the trust fund.
The risk that a trustee’s personal liability may exceed its
actual indemnity from the trust, while commercially
unpalatable, does not legally preclude a party from
contracting in its capacity as trustee.
To reconcile this with the statements of Jacobson J,
one must assume that he also concluded that the scope of
Mr Goodridge’s consent (which expressly referred to
securitisation programs) by implication extended to the
inclusion of a limitation of liability clause in a form
typically required by such trustees. Accordingly, where
documents do not expressly provide for novation to a
trustee, there remains some doubt as to whether the
inclusion of a trustee limitation of liability clause may
require further consent from the borrower.
Assignment
Although the court had decided that the novation
from Macquarie to Leveraged Equities was effective, it
went on to consider whether Macquarie’s rights were
capable of assignment to Leveraged Equities.19 In con-
cluding that the rights were capable of assignment,
Jacobson J noted that:
• the LSAexpressly provided that Macquarie’s rights
were capable of assignment without Mr Goodridge’s
consent, and clearly contemplated that this might
occur; and
• in light of such express consent, the rights were
assignable unless they constituted personal obli-
gations of a character which could not be assigned
in law or in equity (such as an employer’s rights to
the benefit of an employee).
Jacobson J did not consider that the rights were of
such a personal nature and held that Rares J’s approach
was contrary to both established authorities and texts.20
In any event, Rares J appeared to have incorrectly
focused on whether all rights granted to Macquarie were
capable of assignment, rather than whether the specific
rights relied upon by Leveraged Equities to issue a
margin call notice and sell the securities were assigned.
As pointed out in the case of Don King Productions Inc
v Warren, “assignability is not a matter of all obligations
under a contract or none at all”.21
Jacobson J also noted that, although the contractual
arrangements under which Macquarie’s loan book was
sold were complex, there was a clear division between
Leveraged Equities’ rights as assignee and Macquarie’s
ongoing obligations to fund. As Jacobson J explained:
… the ultimate effect of the Transaction Documents, so far
as they concerned assignment, was that Macquarie bore the
ultimate financial responsibility of providing further advances
to the borrower, while Leveraged Equities, as assignee, had
the right to repayment of the funds and the right to exercise
powers on default.22
On a closer examination of the contractual docu-
ments, the arrangements were not unworkable and there
were not two “banks” that could independently exercise
the rights of a lender.23 Accordingly, “[w]hether or not
there was any bifurcation of rights as the primary judge
suggested, there was certainly no duplication”.24
This finding clarifies that there is no legal barrier to a
lender assigning its right of repayment under a partially
drawn or revolving loan while retaining the obligation to
make future advances.
Notice
Jacobson J also disagreed with Rares J’s interpreta-
tion of ss 12 and 170 of the Conveyancing Act. Rares J
held that to perfect a legal assignment in accordance
with s 12, the debtor must receive actual notice of
assignment, and that deemed service in accordance with
the service provisions of s 170 is insufficient. Although
the comments were obiter dicta,25 Jacobson J noted that
where s 170(1)(b) is satisfied,26 there will be a presump-
tion under s 160 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) that the
notice was received, unless there is sufficient evidence to
raise doubt as to the presumption.27
Unconscionable conduct
Rares J previously found that in requiringMrGoodridge
to meet the margin call deadline, Leveraged Equities had
unconscionably insisted on its rights in breach of s 12CB
of the Australian Securities and Investments Commis-
sion Act 2001 (Cth) (ASIC Act).
The court overturned this finding, stating that:
• s 12CB only applies to financial services of a kind
ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or house-
hold use;28 and
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• in any event, there is nothing unconscionable in a
margin lender enforcing its legal rights to protect
itself against a fall in the value of its security.29
The LSA contained a number of representations and
warranties by Mr Goodridge. One of them was that the
loan would be applied by Mr Goodridge wholly or
predominantly for business or investment purposes. The
court stated that whether the funds were subsequently
invested for the purpose of providing for his retirement
was not relevant to the question of whether s 12CB was
engaged.30
In reaching this conclusion, it is unclear what weight
was given to Mr Goodridge’s business purpose repre-
sentation. Whether financial services are of a kind
ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household
use is generally considered to be a question of fact.31
The ASIC Act does not contain express provisions
allowing business purpose declarations to be relied upon
by a lender for the purpose of s 12CB. Nonetheless,
given that the ordinary nature of margin lending arrange-
ments was not discussed in detail, it appears that the
court considers business purpose declarations to be of
some relevance in considering whether such provisions
of the ASIC Act are engaged.
Lessons to be learned
The Goodridge appeal contains a number of practical
lessons for both bankers and lawyers.
Drafting
Clarity of drafting is critical.
The Goodridge litigation was primarily concerned
with issues of construction which “would not have
arisen had the Loan and Security Agreement (LSA) been
competently drafted”.32
In a short judgment focusing solely on the drafting
quality of the LSA, Stone J noted that “[i]t is difficult to
understand how the imprecision and ambiguity of the
documentation could have escaped the scrutiny of com-
petent and sophisticated parties and their advisors”, and
that “[m]ore precise use of language may well have
avoided this expensive and time consuming litiga-
tion”.33
In light of such scathing judicial comment, it is no
surprise that law firms involved in the appeal have felt
the need to expressly disclaim any involvement in the
original drafting of the LSA. This is a forceful reminder
to practitioners to ensure that contracts, particularly
complex or standard form documents, are drafted clearly
and precisely.
Assignment and novation clauses
Courts will give effect to clearly worded clauses
prospectively authorising the assignment or novation of
contractual rights and obligations (however, these clauses
should be revisited in light of this judgment).
The decision clarifies that courts will give effect to
clearly worded clauses prospectively authorising the
assignment or novation of contractual rights and obliga-
tions. However, in light of this decision, assignment and
novation clauses included in precedents and standard
form documents should be revisited and may need to be
amended. To avoid disputes, a clause granting prospec-
tive consent to the novation of a contract must clearly
address and authorise all essential elements of a nova-
tion.
Notice provisions
Notice provisions should be carefully considered for
each individual transaction.
Although Jacobson J indicated that parties may rely
upon certain evidential presumptions regarding service,
it is apparent that supporting evidence may still be
required in limited cases.
Parties therefore need to consider if electronic com-
munications such as email should be permitted under the
terms of the document as an alternative to, or in addition
to, traditional methods of post or fax. Not only is the
dispatch and receipt of electronic communications gov-
erned by mostly uniform state and Commonwealth
legislation,34 but electronic communications may sim-
plify record keeping and be easier to prove in the event
of dispute. Notice provisions should not be blindly
inserted as boilerplate, but rather need to be discussed
with clients in light of their real-life systems and
procedures.
Unconscionability
In the absence of any improper conduct, there is
nothing unconscionable in a margin lender enforcing its
legal rights to protect itself against a fall in the value of
its security.
Provided that lenders act in accordance with the
terms of their lending documents, to protect against
adverse effects on the value in the security, it will be
difficult for borrowers to challenge enforcement sales on
unsubstantiated claims of “unconscionability”.
Appeal
On 11 February 2011, Mr Goodridge filed an appli-
cation for special leave to appeal to the High Court. The
application submits that the Full Court of the Federal
Court erred in finding that:
• there was a valid novation and assignment of the
LSA; and
• that Leveraged Equities was authorised to sell
Mr Goodridge’s securities.
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In considering whether to grant the application for
special leave, s 35A of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)
states that the High Court may have regard to any
matters that it considers relevant but must have regard
to:
• whether the proceedings involve a question of law
that is of public importance, or in respect of which
there is differing judicial opinion; and
• whether the interests of the administration of
justice require consideration by the High Court.
Even if special leave is granted, following such a
critical and comprehensive rejection of the first instance
decision, it is clear that any successful appeal by Mr
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